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Warden of the Utah ] 
State Prison, ] 
Respondent. ) 
) Case No. 20010875-SC 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
) CAPITAL CASE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition challenging the 
conviction in a capital case. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 65(o)and to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-l 10. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Was the petitioner, Mr. Gardner, denied the effective assistance of appellate 
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution when his appellate counsel failed to challenge an erroneous instruction on the 
mental state necessary for a jury finding of first degree capital murder? 
Issues of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are mixed questions of law and 
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fact. The facts are reviewed in the light most favorable to the lower court findings and the 
appellate court will not reverse these findings if there is a reasonable basis to support the 
facts found by the trial court. Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989). The appellate 
court exercises de novo review of the legal conclusions for correctness. Fernandez v. 
Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989.) 
This issue was preserved by the filing of the petition and the opposition to the 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. (See, Petition, R. 1-162; and Petitioner's 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 374-396.) 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution: "In all criminal proceedings, the 
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution: " . . . nor shall any state 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )[in effect in 1985] "Criminal homicide 
constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another under any of the following circumstances:..." 
Utah Code Ann § 76-2-103(2): "Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect 
to his conduct or to the circumstances surrounding his conduct when is aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to the result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Gardner was tried and convicted of the capital murder of Michael Burdell in 
1985. His conviction and sentence were subsequently affirmed by this Court in State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). He then filed a post-
conviction petition which was granted in part in 1991. This Court reversed the partial grant 
of the petition in Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 680 (Utah 1994), cert denied, 516 U.S. 
828 (1995), affirming the conviction and sentence in the underlying case. Thereafter, Mr. 
Gardner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court which is currently 
pending. The instant petition was filed on May 10, 2000, in Third District Court. The 
petition was denied on the merits by Judge Frank G. Noel on October 4,2001. Mr. Gardner 
filed a timely notice of appeal from this ruling on October 23, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Trial Facts 
At trial, there was little dispute about the facts surrounding the shooting of Michael 
Burdell. Mr. Gardner was in custody pending trial on murder charges in an unrelated case.1 
On April 2, 1985, he was due in court for the hearing on pre-trial motions in that case. 
Prior to his arrival at the courthouse that morning, Mr. Gardner had planned an escape 
where a small caliber gun would be left hanging on a water fountain in the basement of the 
*Mr. Gardner entered a guilty plea in this other case and is currently serving a life 
sentence with the recommendation from the trial judge that he remain in custody the 
remainder of his natural life. 
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courthouse. (T. 1190-98.)2 Rather than leaving the gun as previously planned, an 
accomplice handed him a .22 caliber handgun in the basement as he was brought in by two 
guards. (T. 787.) Mr. Gardner's legs were chained together and his hands were cuffed and 
attached to his waist so that he could raise his hands no more than a few inches above his 
waist. (T. 1236.) He remained chained in that manner throughout his abortive escape 
attempt. 
Almost immediately after being handed the gun in the basement lobby, Mr. Gardner 
was shot by Officer Hensley, one of the guards who had entered the building with him. Mr. 
Gardner was hit in the chest with the officer's .38 caliber bullet, and he sustained a serious 
injury, which required hospitalization. (T. 790-792; 1107.) Officer Hensley exchanged gun 
shots with Mr. Gardner in the basement lobby before the officer exited the lobby to the 
adjacent parking lot area. 
Mr. Gardner then entered into an office area off the basement lobby, which housed 
the archived files from the district court. Inside the archives office were court clerks, a 
corrections officer and two lawyers, Robert Macri and Michael Burdell. (T. 995-997; 
1030-1031) 
2The Reporter's Transcript of the trial is contained as Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 to 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. The page reference is to the original 
transcript page rather than the current record page for easier reference and because 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment has not yet been indexed by the Third District 
Court. 
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While Mr. Macri was in the archives office, he heard a commotion in the lobby area. 
(T. 995.) He looked into the lobby area, saw Mr. Gardner with a gun and hid with Mr. 
Burdell behind one of the double doors that separated the archives room from the lobby 
area. (T. 998.) Mr. Macri was six foot two and weighed 300 pounds. (T. 1019.) Almost 
immediately, Mr. Gardner entered the archives room, went past the doors, behind which the 
two lawyers were standing and approached the counter area inside the archives room. Mr. 
Gardner then turned to leave the office and walked within a few feet of Mr. Macri and Mr. 
Burdell. 
Mr. Macri saw that Mr. Gardner was bleeding, looked wounded and very confused. 
Mr. Gardner had a blank and helpless look. (T. 1026.) Mr. Gardner was still handcuffed 
and chained at the waist. Mr. Gardner pointed the gun at Mr. Macri but did not say or do 
anything. Within seconds, Mr. Macri started to flee from behind the doors. (T. 1024-
1025.) Mr. Gardner seemed to become aware of the blood from his wound; Mr. Macri 
heard Mr. Burdell say "Oh, my God," and Mr. Gardner say "Oh, fu-." As Mr. Macri fled, he 
saw Mr. Gardner move the gun towards Mr. Burdell and he heard the gun fire as he ran out 
the door to the lobby. (T. 1003; 1024-1025.) The entire encounter at the doors inside the 
office from the time Mr. Gardner was startled by the lawyers behind the door until the 
shooting of Mr. Burdell took no more than a few seconds. 
After the shooting of Mr. Burdell, Mr. Gardner attempted to exit the back of 
the archives office. (T. 1037.) There he saw a corrections officer, Richard Thomas, in the 
rear of the archives office. Officer Thomas was in uniform at the time. Mr. Gardner did 
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not attempt to shoot this officer. The day of the shooting, Officer Thomas described Mr. 
Gardner as glassy-eyed, incoherent and being in such a state of panic that he probably didn't 
recognize Officer Thomas, who knew Mr. Gardner previously. (T. 1052, 1055.) At trial, 
Officer Thomas testified that he could not remember whether Mr. Gardner was glassy-
eyed. 
Edward Seamons, a clerk in the archives office, saw Mr. Gardner enter the office, 
shuffling because of the chains, as he walked past the two attorneys behind the entrance 
doors. (T. 938-942.) Seamons saw Mr. Gardner turn to exit the office and face the two 
attorneys. Mr. Seamons believed the gun was aimed at Mr. Burdell's head and was about a 
foot or so away when the gun "went off." (T. 942-943.) 
Mr. Gardner testified to his escape plans (T. 1190) and his intentional firing at 
Officer Kirk. (T. 1207.) He testified about his chest wound (T. 1200) and the 
circumstances surrounding the shooting of Mr. Burdell, although he was unable to recall 
the exact moments of the shooting. (T. 1207) He denied intentionally shooting Mr. 
Burdell. (T. 1257.) 
Raymond Cooper, a firearms expert, testified that the weapon was a .22 caliber 
revolver, with a single action. (T. 11140; 1148.) He testified that the gun could fire if the 
hammer was resting against the pin and the hammer was jarred. (T. 1160.) The gun would 
also fire if the hammer was pulled back while a person's finger was on the trigger. (T. 
1154.) He tested the gun by hitting it with a hammer and he could not get the gun to fire 
from the fully cocked position. (T. 1151.) 
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2. Counsels' Arguments at Trial and the Erroneous Instruction 
During the trial, Mr. Gardner's counsel conceded that he was responsible for the 
shooting of Michael Burdell, but that the shooting was at most a second degree depraved 
indifference murder. In opening statements, trial counsel, James Valdez, stated that "We 
submit, ladies and gentlemen, that Mr. Gardner did not commit a capital homicide. The 
state has overcharged him in that regard and that what was really committed was a lesser 
included offense." (T. 759.) Trial counsel focused his entire opening statement on the 
capital homicide charge and did not mention the other charges once. "A lot of these things 
we are not going to dispute the obvious, ladies and gentlemen. A lot of these things are so 
obvious that it is undisputable. But the main element that we want you to look at is the 
element of intent, the state that Mr. Gardner was in at the time... The missing element 
there is intent, ladies and gentlemen." (T. 763-764.) 
Trial counsel informed the jury in the opening statement that in order to find capital 
murder, "[f]irst you have to find that it was an intentional killing. That's going to be a key 
word and a key element throughout the trial. Throughout the trial intent is going to be a key 
issue, I submit, because that intent will decide whether or not this is a capital murder, a 
second-degree murder or a manslaughter, and if you find there is no intent, then you can't 
come back - you can't come back with a capital homicide. It is a necessary element to 
capital homicide which includes the death penalty." (T. 761.) 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel requested a proper definition of 
the instruction on "knowingly." (Exhibit 8 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment 
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["As used in these instructions, a person engages in conduct 'knowingly' or with 
'knowledge' when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result."].) 
The trial court rejected this instruction and instead improperly instructed the jury in 
language that did not require the jury to find that the petitioner's conduct was "reasonably 
certain to cause the result." (Exhibit 7 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Instruction #20.) 
Instruction #20 reads in its entirety as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: (1) "Intentionally" when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to 
cause the result; or (2) "Knowingly" when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct, or the existing circumstances, or is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(Exhibit 7 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment [emphasis added].) 
The trial court instructed the jury regarding the procedure to follow in considering 
the lesser included offenses of capital murder in Count I: 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the 
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt it is your duty to 
find the defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree 
as charged in Count I of the Information. On the other hand, if the evidence 
has failed to so establish one or more of said elements, of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, you shall then consider the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant of the lesser included offense of Criminal 
Murder in the Second Degree. 
With reference to Count I, you determine his guilt or innocence of 
Capital Murder, Murder in the First Degree. If that is your verdict, then you 
don't have to further consider the included offenses within Count I. 
Has (sic) you can see, if you start from the bottom and work up, them 
(sic) being included offenses, you will find any more or all of those to exist, 
so you start at the top under Count I, and work down as I have instructed you 
in the last sentence. 
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If you find him not guilty of murder in the first degree, you shall then 
consider the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the lesser included 
offense of capital homicide, murder in the second degree. 
(Respondent's Exhibit 7, Instruction #27a.) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized this instruction to the jury: "[A]nd 
the court has repeatedly told you you don't explore the lesser includeds, you don't consider 
second-degree or manslaughter just because you want to. Only if after considering and 
evaluating the first-degree murder charge, and if you have a reasonable doubt as to the first-
degree, then you consider the others." (T. 1370.) 
In closing argument, the prosecutor noted the second required element of first 
degree murder is "that Ronnie Lee Gardner caused said death either intentionally or 
knowingly." (T. 1303.) He then acknowledged that this was the key issue in the trial. 
"From the comments made during opening statements, it is apparent that this is the element, 
that this is the issue that the defendant contests." (Ibid.) The prosecutor then read the 
incorrect instruction verbatim to the jury. (T. 1303-1304.) He informed the jury that "that 
the element of intentionally or knowingly is, again, in the alternative. The state doesn't 
have to prove both, that he intentionally and knowingly caused the death, only one of them, 
either intentionally or knowingly. I think this is quite important. As you read the 
instructions, you see that both are concerned with the conduct or results. Don't have to 
even intend the results as long as you intend to engage in the conduct that produces the 
results, and that's the key, the conduct." (Ibid.) 
9 
Defense counsel, Andrew Valdez, focused his entire closing argument on the capital 
homicide charge, conceding that the other offenses were committed by Mr. Gardner. 
"[W]e put Mr. Gardner on the stand. And essentially he gave what amounted to a judicial 
concession perhaps to the aggravated kidnapping and the other related charges." (T. 1323.) 
"The issue we tried to contend with from the outset is the issue of intent...." (Ibid.) This 
theme ran throughout the closing argument. "So you have to look to see if he had the intent 
to kill when he, in fact acted. It is not whether he intended his conduct to be a certain way, 
it is whether he intended to kill Mr. Burdell at the point when he saw the blur and heard the 
explosion." (T. 1345.) In conclusion, trial counsel stated, "[T]here is going to be reasons 
to doubt that he is guilty of an intentional killing. And we submit to you, ladies and 
gentlemen, then that he is guilty of second-degree murder or manslaughter but not 
intentional killing." (T. 1355.) 
The jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder; however, the verdict form does 
not reflect whether the mental state element was based on an intentional or knowing killing. 
(Exhibit 7 to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 598.) 
3. Mr. Gardner's Direct Appeal 
Mr. Gardner was represented on direct appeal by attorneys other than trial counsel 
within the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association. The issue concerning the erroneous 
jury instruction on the mental state requirement for first degree murder was not raised on 
appeal. Both of Mr. Gardner's appellate counsel have stated that they did not purposely 
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exclude this issue from the direct appeal. (Exhibit E to Petition, R. 97; Exhibit F to 
Petition, R. 141.) 
4. The District's Court Decision on the Merits of the Petition 
In its Memorandum Decision denying the petition on the merits, the district court 
found that the state conceded that the mental state instruction given by the trial court was in 
error. (R. 436.) The district court also concluded that the assignment of error could have 
been raised on direct appeal and addressed by the Supreme Court even under the principles 
of plain error. The district court however found that Mr. Gardner suffered no prejudice 
from counsel's error because the Supreme Court would have found the erroneous 
instruction to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus, there was no reasonable 
probability of a different result. (R. 438-439.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Gardner was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his appellate 
counsel failed to challenge on appeal the giving of an improper instruction on the critical 
element of the requisite mental state for conviction of an intentional or knowing killing. 
While trial counsel requested a proper instruction in the language of the applicable statute, 
the trial judge gave an instruction which the state now concedes is erroneous. 
While the district court in this petition found that the instruction was erroneous and 
that the instruction involved the critical issue before the jury, the court's conclusion that 
this error was harmless was incorrect. When a jury is misinstructed on a required element 
of the charge, reversal is automatic. Even if a reversal per se standard is not applied, the 
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error in this case was not harmless, because the element was contested and there was 
sufficient evidence presented at trial to support a contrary finding had the jury been 
properly instructed. 
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION 
DENIED MR. GARDNER HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE APPELLATE COUNSEL 
1. The Standards of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
The United States Supreme Court has established the clear law regarding the 
process by which a court is to determine if a defendant has been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
The proper standard for this Court to apply is whether, in light of all the 
circumstances, counsel's acts or omissions were outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance. 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable. 
Id. at 687. 
Appellate courts in this state have consistently applied the same two prong standard 
established in Strickland, when assessing the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. "The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same 
12 
as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bruner v. Carver, 920 
P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996); Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 
826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
Appellate counsel may be ineffective if counsel fails to raise a meritorious issue on 
appeal, even if other strong but unsuccessful claims were raised. Carter v. Galetka, 2001 
Ut 96, P.3d. (Utah 2001). Following the Tenth Circuit's analysis of this issue, 
this Court has indicated that the omitted issue should be obvious from the record and one 
which probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Ibid., citing Banks v. Reynolds, 
54 F.3d 1508, 1515, n. 3 (10th Or. 1993). 
Thus, while the particular constitutional protection may flow from the Fourteenth 
Amendment rather than the Sixth Amendment, the legal and factual analysis of the issue of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that when trial counsel's 
representation is at issue. 
2. The Performance Prong of Strickland in this Case 
The analysis of the representation of appellate counsel must begin with the fact that 
there is no question that the instruction provided the jury is an erroneous statement of the 
law. The proper definition is contained in the relevant statute. See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
103. The State forthrightly has conceded this fact and the district court acknowledged this 
fact as well. Moreover, the error is reflected on the face of the trial court record which 
was reviewed by appellate counsel. This record shows that trial counsel requested the 
proper instruction, that the trial court gave an improper instruction, and that the prosecutor 
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in closing arguments read the improper instruction to the jury and emphasized the error in 
his arguments to the jury. 
In this case, while appellate counsel raised numerous issues on appeal, they 
overlooked a clear error contained on the face of the record which went to the sole issue 
contested at trial - Mr. Gardner's mental state when he shot Mr. Burdell. Nor can this 
failure cannot be attributed to a tactical decision to abandon this issue for some legal 
reason. Neither appellate attorney testified that the issue was examined, researched and 
then rejected in favor of stronger more meritorious issues. Thus, this case is unlike Smith 
v. Murray, All U.S. 527 (1986) in which the United States Supreme Court held that a 
deliberate tactical decision to abandon an issue after an examination of the record is within 
the bounds of professional conduct for appellate counsel. 
Butterfield is instructive on the procedure this Court must follow in examining the 
legal issue de novo. There, the appellate court examined each of the alleged omissions of 
appellate counsel and the reasons for each omission. Appellate counsel testified that they 
had examined each issue and gave specific reasons for the decision not to raise a particular 
issue. Counsel also testified that they believed the main appellate claim was meritorious 
and that they intentionally focused their attention on that issue. Nevertheless, the court 
found that appellate counsel failed to meet the performance prong of Strickland because 
their legal conclusion on one issue of the admission of evidence of prior sexual experience 
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was incorrect.3 On another issue, the court did not reach the question of whether the failure 
to raise a non-frivolous issue fell below the reasonableness standard, deciding the issue 
instead on the basis that petitioner could not meet the prejudice prong. Butterfield, 817 
P.2d at 338. 
Here, Mr. Gardner has demonstrated that this claim was not examined and rejected 
for any strategic or legal reason. It was simply overlooked by appellate counsel. Thus, he 
has met the first prong of the test.4 
3. The Prejudice Prong of Strickland in this Case 
Without citation to case law, the district court concluded that Mr. Gardner could not 
show prejudice because the district court concluded that the error was reviewable under a 
harmless error standard. Mr. Gardner contends first that the district court erred by not 
applying a per se standard for reversal, given the nature of the instructional error, and 
second that even under harmless error review, reversal is required. 
The appellant/petitioner in Butterfield did not meet the prejudice prong because the 
appellate court determined that the error was harmless and therefore not prejudicial, as did 
the district court here. As more fully discussed below, the district court's legal conclusion 
on the prejudice prong of Strickland is erroneous and requires reversal in this case. 
4The district court memorandum decision appears at one juncture to mix the two 
prongs. {See, R. 438-439.) The court there concluded that appellate counsel were not 
"deficient" because "the raising of the issue would not have resulted in a different 
outcome." While this formulation may not be correct, it is not necessary to reach this 
language in consideration of this appeal. The district court in essence adopted a proper 
methodology of Strickland error by examining the prejudice prong separately from the 
performance prong. {See, Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d at 337.) However, in this case, 
the district court had already, and properly, found that Mr. Gardner had established his 
proof pf the performance prong by concluding that appellate counsel should have raised a 
challenge to the erroneous instruction. (See, R. 436.) 
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In this case, as the district court properly found, the central issue in the trial was the 
mental state of Mr. Gardner at the time he shot Mr. Burdell. (R. 436 ["the central issue for 
the trier of fact was the intent of Mr. Gardner at the time of the shooting."].) The critical 
element for the mental state required for an intentional or knowing killing is a specific 
intent to kill or a mental state equivalent to a specific intent to kill. This mental state has 
been described by this Court as having the "purpose to kill." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 
254, 260, n. 3 (Utah 1988). "We believe, on the contrary, that the term 'specific intent' has 
utility in describing a culpable mental state, or mind set, that describes a required purpose, 
knowledge, attitude, or motive, in addition to the mere volitional act, such as pulling a 
trigger, which has no inherent moral value but causes a killing." Ibid. This Court has 
elsewhere described the mental state as one of "intent to kill or knowledge that one's acts 
would result in death if carried out." State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 642 (Utah 
1997)(Durham, J., plurality opinion.)5 
Here, the jury instruction did not distinguish for the jury Mr. Gardner's act in pulling 
the trigger or holding the gun as it went off, which clearly caused Mr. Burdell's death, from 
the required intent to kill or its moral equivalent required by the statute. Thus, the 
instruction was not only a misstatement of Utah law, it also violated due process of law as 
5While this language is stated in the context of an attempted murder charge, the 
appellate courts have consistently held that to be guilty of attempted murder the defendant 
must have the identical mental state required for the completed offense. See, e..g., State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156-1157 (Utah 1991). What is lacking in this case is an 
instruction requiring knowledge that the acts would cause Mr. BurdelPs death. 
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guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment under Sands from v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 
(1979). The jury was able to convict petitioner solely on his being aware of his conduct, 
thus improperly permitting the jury to presume the requisite mens rea for first degree 
murder. 
Moreover, the prosecutor used this erroneous instruction to inform the jury that Mr. 
Gardner did not have to "intend the results as long as he intended to engage in the conduct 
that produces the results, and that the key, the conduct." (T. 1304-1305; R. 49-50.) The 
prosecutor even focused on Mr. Gardner's general plan of escape rather than the conduct at 
the time Mr. Burdell was shot. 
In this context, the instruction omitted an essential element of the mens rea 
necessary for a proper finding of first degree murder. The jury could well have adopted the 
prosecutor's arguments and the improper instruction and based the verdict on a finding that 
Mr. Gardner was aware of his actions in attempting to escape with a gun and that during the 
escape Mr. Burdell was killed. This would permit the jury to convict without ever requiring 
the prosecution to make the showing that Mr. Gardner had the intent to shoot Mr. Burdell, 
or was reasonably certain to know that his acts would cause the death of Mr. Burdell. 
Not only did the erroneous instruction go to the key element in this case, it also 
involved Mr. Gardner's mental state which is an essential element of the charge of first 
degree murder. This mental element applies only to first degree murder in this case as the 
jury was not instructed on an intentional or knowing second degree murder. 
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"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an 
offense is essential. Failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error." State v. Roberts, 
711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985). While not addressed by the district court, the State argued 
below that reversal is only warranted when the court fails to instruct entirely on an element 
of the offense. See, State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991). This case holds that 
failure to instruct on an element of the offense requires per se reversal. However, this case 
relies on the language from Roberts thus implying that an inaccurate instruction of the 
essential elements of the offense is the equivalent of the absence of the instruction. In 
Jones, this Court wrote that "[t]he jury must be instructed with respect to all the legal 
elements that it must find to convict of the c rime charged, and that the absence of such an 
instruction is reversible error as a matter of law." Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. Thus, the 
misinstruction in this case has the same impact as a failure to instruct on an element of the 
offense, because the erroneous mens rea instruction allowed the jury to convict without 
ever finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gardner had the requisite mens rea under 
the statute. Thus, automatic reversal is required, and the district court erred by applying 
harmless error review.6 
Even if automatic reversal is not mandated, the prosecution has the burden of 
showing that the instruction error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since it involves 
6While the United States Supreme Court has held that such instructional error is 
subject to harmless error review, that holding does not prohibit this Court from applying a 
higher standard for the error in this case. {See, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 
(1999).) 
18 
a federal constitutional right in that the failure to instruct the jury properly on the element 
of the offense denied him a fundamentally fair trial as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The harmless error test requires the prosecution to demonstrate "beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1966). The harmless error inquiry in the 
instructional error context must be: "Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?" Neder, 527 U.S. at 18. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Neder: 
Of course, safeguarding the jury guarantee will often require 
that a reviewing court conduct a thorough examination of the 
record. If at the end of that examination, the court cannot 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would 
have been the same absent the error - for example, where the 
defendant contested the omitted element and raised sufficient 
evidence to support a contrary finding - it should not find the 
error harmless. 
(Id at 19.) 
Given the disputed nature of Mr. Gardner's mental state at the time Mr. Burdell was 
shot, the prosecution cannot meet its this high burden. The required element was the only 
disputed issue at trial. In addition, Mr. Gardner presented sufficient evidence to warrant a 
contrary finding as the trial court gave a number of lesser included instructions based 
solely on the mental state evidence and on the contested issue of the mental state element 
of the various degrees of murder and manslaughter. 
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Thus, the district court erred by concluding that no rational juror would have 
returned a verdict other than first degree murder had the jury been properly instructed. The 
district court erred by concluding that the record demonstrated that Mr. Gardner would 
automatically been guilty of first degree murder because no jury would have found that he 
was not reasonably certain to know that the firing of a "large caliber handgun" would have 
caused the death of Mr. Burdell. (R. 438-439.) 
The district court's conclusion is based on an erroneous reading of the facts - that 
the weapon was "a large caliber handgun." If the record does not support the factual 
conclusions of the district court, this Court can make the proper factual finding. Medina v. 
Cook, 779 P.2d 658 (Utah 1989). Here, the record reflects that the gun was .22 caliber 
revolver, a small caliber weapon. (T. 1157.) Thus, had the bullet hit Mr. Burdell a mere 
inch or two away from its actual point of entry, Mr. Burdell might have suffered only minor 
injuries. The weapon was not the type which would have created damage to a wider area as a 
"large caliber handgun" would have. Reversal is required on this factual error in the district 
court's ruling alone. 
In addition, the error concerned the critical aspect of the entire trial. Contrary to 
the district court's conclusion, the judge at trial found that there was sufficient evidence to 
provide lesser included instructions on "depraved indifference" and "recklessness." By 
finding the instructional error harmless, this Court would have to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that no rational jury could have returned a lesser verdict in this case had the jury been 
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properly instructed.7 No such legal conclusion is warranted on the basis of the record 
which includes the two factors examined by the United States Supreme Court in these 
circumstances - contention between the parties on the specific erroneous element and 
sufficient evidence to support a contrary finding. Therefore, reversal of the district court 
ruling is required. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the record in this case, it is hereby respectfully 
requested that this Court reverse the dismissal of the petition in this matter and order a new 
trial for Mr. Gardner on the first degree murder charge. 
Dated: 
Jairfes C. Bradshaw 
idrew Pames 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Ronnie Lee Gardner 
7Because of the specific jury instruction regarding how the jury should consider 
lesser included verdicts in this case (Instruction 27A) and the prosecutor's closing 
argument (T. 1370), the fact that these other instructions were given is not relevant to the 
harmless error determination here. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. go 
A person engages in conduct: 
1. "Intentionally" when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or to cause the result; or 
2. "Knowingly" when he is aware of the nature of his conduct, or the 
existing circumstances, or is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
nn 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Petitioner, I CASE NO. 000903842 
vs. : 




The Court has reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
together with the Memoranda filed in connection with the Motion, 
and having heard oral argument and taken the matter under 
advisement, now rules as follows: 
Issues regarding whether the petitioner is procedurally barred 
from making this claim were resolved by the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis in February, 2001, prior to her recusal in 
this case* This Motion for Summary Judgment goes to the merits of 
petitioner's claim, and both parties have agreed that an 
evidentiary hearing is unnecessary and that the Court can make the 
decision on the merits of the case based on the record, when ruling 
on this Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The single issue in this case is whether appellate counsel for 
Mr. Gardner provided ineffective assistance when they failed to 
include in their appeal of the underlying criminal case, the claim 
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that the jury at the time of trial was improperly instructed on the 
definition of an intentional and knowing killing. 
The standard for determining ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel for purposes of this case is the same as the 
standard for determining ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
See. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); and Bruner v. 
Carver. 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996). Petitioner must show that (1) 
appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable conduct, and (2) that counselfs deficient performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Under the facts and circumstances of 
this case, an analysis of counsel's performance overlaps somewhat 
into the second prong of the Strickland test, i.e., whether 
defendant was prejudiced. For example, how could counsel's 
performance in failing to include the "knowing" jury instruction 
issue in their appeal fall below the required standard if there was 
no reasonable likelihood that there would be a different outcome 
even if they had included the issue in the appeal. And because the 
Court's ruling on the "prejudice prong" of Strickland is 
dispositive of this case, the Court will turn to that analysis 
first. 
The State argues that petitioner could not have been 
prejudiced, even if there was deficient performance, because 
appellate counsel was precluded from raising the issue since it was 
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not preserved for appeal. Mr. Gardner argues, on the other hand, 
that the issue was preserved for appeal simply by the submission to 
the trial court by defense counsel of the correct jury instruction, 
even though defense counsel did not subsequently object on the 
record to the instruction given by the Court. Mr. Gardner also 
argues that it does not matter that the issue was not preserved on 
appeal, since this was plain error and worked a manifest injustice 
to the petitioner. The Court is not persuaded by the Statefs 
argument. In this case, the central issue for the trier of fact 
was the intent of Mr. Gardner at the time of the shooting. Both 
parties have agreed that the instruction on an intentional and 
knowing killing was in error, and this Court is of the opinion that 
it is therefore clear on the record, and that had the Supreme Court 
felt that the erroneous instruction tainted the jury verdict or 
that the submission of the correct instruction may have resulted in 
a different outcome, then they clearly could have addressed the 
issue. 
This Court is also not persuaded, however, that had the issue 
regarding the improper instruction been raised on appeal, there 
would have been a probability of a different outcome. The Court 
finds this to be so for the following reason. The jury instruction 
in question is based on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-2-103, which 
reads as follows: 
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A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or 
to a result of his conduct, when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect 
to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with 
respect to a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
1. Intentionally when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or to cause the result, or 
2. Knowingly when he is aware of the nature 
of his conduct or the existing circumstances, 
or is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
Petitioner argues that the statutory definition of "knowingly" 
requires that the actor not only be aware of the nature of his 
conduct, but that his conduct would be reasonably certain to cause 
the result, whereas the instruction given by the Court would permit 
the jury to determine guilt based upon a finding that the actor was 
aware of the nature of his conduct but did not necessarily 
understand that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
It is significant to know that petitionees defense in the 
criminal case was that he did not know what he was doing when he 
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shot Mr. Burdell, but did not present evidence on the second prong 
of the "knowing" instruction, that is, that he was not aware his 
conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result. The error in 
the "knowing" instruction now claimed by petitioner does not go to 
the disputed issue in the case, that is, whether petitioner knew 
what he was doing when he shot Mr. Burdell in the face. 
All that aside, however, the Court is persuaded that 
petitioner suffered no prejudice because of the erroneous 
instruction, for the following reason: petitioner must concede that 
the jury found either that petitioner intentionally killed Mr. 
Burdell, in which case that would be the end of the matter, or that 
they found the killing was "knowing." If the jury found that the 
killing was "knowing," then in order for petitioner to prevail in 
this case, he would have to argue that the jury found that he was 
aware of the nature of his conduct but, had the instruction been 
correctly given to them, would have found that he was not aware 
that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result. Under 
the facts and circumstances of this case, that would be a fantastic 
claim. Mr. Gardner would have to convince the jury that he was 
aware of his conduct in pointing and firing a large caliber handgun 
into the face and head of Michael Burdell, but was not aware that 
death was reasonably certain to follow. The Court is of the 
opinion that no rational juror would make such a finding. It 
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appears to the Court that the evidence is overwhelming that if Mr. 
Gardner understood the nature of his conduct in shooting Mr. 
Burdell from approximately 1-1/2 feet in the face with a large 
caliber handgun, then he would know that death was reasonably 
certain. Petitioner in this case has failed to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence or even by a reasonable probability 
that had the issue of the erroneous instruction been raised by 
appellate counsel, that there may have been a different outcome. 
The Court is of the opinion that had this issue been addressed by 
the Supreme Court, that they would have analyzed the prejudice 
issue in a similar fashion and that the State would have been able 
to show beyond a reasonable doubt the harmlessness of the error. 
Returning to the issue of whether appellate counselfs 
performance was deficient, the Court notes again that this issue 
overlaps into the issue of prejudice. While appellate counsel's 
performance might be said to be deficient in failing to raise on 
appeal the issue of an erroneous instruction regarding the intent 
of the petitioner at the time of the shooting, how can it be said 
to be deficient if the raising of that issue would not have 
resulted in a different outcome? For that reason alone, the Court 
finds that appellate counsel's performance did not fall below the 
required standard. 
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For the reasons stated above, the Court grants the Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismisses the Petition. 
Counsel for the respondent is to prepare an appropriate set of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order. 
Dated this ) day of September, 2001. 
FRANf G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW# 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND 
JUDGMENT FOR, RESPONDENT 
Judge Frank, G. Noel 
WiHi II i i i l n I N U N 2 
On August 3, 2 00] , the Court heard argument on,, respondent's 
second summary j udgment: mot ion Thomas Br 1 inker appeared 
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and having reviewed the paper? '^.^ •- !J * aummary judgment 
: net )f the motion, the 
parties do :••-• M: spate the f ax • * re-i-^i --. , 2) makes the 
conclusions of law recited below; and 3) grants respondent's 
summary judgment motion, dismisses the petition with prejudice, 
and enters judgment in respondent's favor. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. The State of Utah charged petitioner with first degree 
murder for killing Michael Burdell while trying to escape from 
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice in 1985. 
2. In order to convict, the State had to prove that 
petitioner caused Mr. Burdell's death either *intentionally" or 
"knowingly," and the existence of at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
3. Utah detined the "intentional" and "knowing" mental 
states as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause 
the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to 
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or 
with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct 
when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain 
to cause the result. 
4. For purposes of this motion, the parties do not dispute 
that proving petitioner "knowingly" killed Mr. Burdell required 
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7. The jury convicted petitioner of first degree murder and 
sentenced him to death. 
8. Petitioner's appellate counsel did not challenge the 
sufficiency of the trial court's instruction defining 
*knowingly." 
9. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and 
sentence on direct appeal, 
10. Petitioner previously filed a state post conviction 
petition. The post conviction trial court granted the petition 
in part and denied it in part. The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
that part of the trial court's order granting relief and held 
that petitioner was not entitled to relief. 
11. In response to this second petition, respondent first 
moved for summary judgment based on procedural bar. The Court 
denied that motion. The motion at issue addresses the petition's 
merits. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner raises a single issue: whether counsel's 
failure to challenge the trial court's definition of "knowingly" 
deprived him of the appellate representation that the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guaranteed. 
2, In order to succeed on the claim, petitioner must prove: 
1) appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective 
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the claim petitioner contends they should have raised, appellate 
counsel did not perform objectively unreasonably. If appellate 
counsel had raised the claim, the state could have shown beyond a 
reasonable doubt that any error in the instruction was harmless• 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Based on the papers filed, the parties arguments, and the 
undisputed facts and legal conclusions cited above, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondent's summary judgment motion addressing the 
merits of the petition is GRANTED; 
2. The petition is DISMISSED with prejudice; 
3. The Court orders judgment entered in respondent's favor. 
DATED . 
BY THE COURT: 
Frank G, Noel 
District Court Judge, Third District 
Approved as to lorm: 
ANDREW PARNES 
JAMES BRADSHAW 
Counsel for Petitioner 
6 
